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Private Leased Telecommunication
Lines: Threats to Continued
International Availability
Jill L. Martin*
INTRODUCTION
Restrictions on the availability of private leased telecommunication lines '
are one of many economic and legal barriers to transborder data flows 2
which foreign countries are imposing. United States leased line users, 3
such as large multinational corporations and government agencies, accus-
tomed to the easy access and sophistication of telecommunications sys-
tems in the United States, are encountering troubles abroad. 4 Many
nations are beginning to treat information and transborder data flows as
national resources to be controlled and exploited, recognizing the potential
benefits as well as the dangers of an information age. Japan and European
countries are actively developing their own telecommunications technolo-
gies, in competition with United States service providers who have long
enjoyed international supremacy. Denial of private leased line access to
American users thus can be seen from the users' perspective as a barrier
to the free flow of information, or from the prohibiting nation's perspec-
tive as a necessary tool facilitating national telecommunications strategies.
This article examines both actual and proposed actions by Japanese and
European telecommunications authorities, known as Ministries of Post,
Telephone, and Telegraph (PTTs), 5 to restrict private leased line availabili-
ty, and then explores the possibility that these actions presage the total
elimination of private leased lines. It concludes that unless the United
States government adopts a unified and reasonable policy opposing the
escalation of regulations and restrictions, their deleterious effects will
become more severe. 6
- Jill L. Martin is a member of the class of 1984, University of Michigan Law School.
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PTT ACTIONS
PTs have increasingly taken actions to regulate or restrict the use of
private leased lines, motivated in part by a desire to increase revenues and
to divert telecommunications traffic from private leased lines to govern-
ment-run public networks. The desires to compete in the international
telecommunications market and to develop sophisticated national and re-
gional networks also play significant motivating roles in PTT efforts to
retain control over the use of private leased lines. Even if no nation actually
abolishes private leased lines, the mere threat of such action negatively
affects American users since it creates an uncertain environment in which
users are reluctant to expand operations. 7
Tariffs
One way in which PTTs restrict the availability of private leased lines is
by manipulating tariff rates, 8 either by increasing the amount of the tariff
or by changing from a flat rate to a usage-sensitive rate system. Although
international guidelines (Recommendations) set by the International Tele-
graph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) of the Internation-
al Telecommunications Union (ITU) 9 ostensibly limit the amount nations
can charge for continental, international and hook-up services, 10 these
Recommendations have not served to limit unilateral tariff increases. 11
One reason why the Recommendations have not limited tariff increases
is that they allow each nation to apply a discretionary multiplication
coefficient, "K," to the initial charge to arrive at a user price; the country
need not justify the coefficient either by service supplied or cost of the
link. 12 When the Recommendations do set limits, they are sometimes
disregarded. For example, although nations are permitted to charge a
premium on a domestic line when it is connected to an international line, 13
the Recommendations set a limit to this extra charge, and West Germany
reportedly disregards this limit. 14
When a nation implements a public network, CCITr Recommendations
provide great flexibility in tariffing, sanctioning an increase in private line
tariffs "to avoid harmful competition among the different types of service
provided by the organization concerned"; '5 they also permit the public
network rates to be set very low in order to divert users from private
lines. '6 In addition, the CCITT encourages PTs to apply an "increase
factor to the rates of other telecommunication services in the same tele-
communication organization which will compensate for the deficit in-
cuffed by services run at a loss," 17 permitting high fees from international
connections to be used to subsidize public services such as rural telephony.
Many nations are considering and some have adopted tariff rates based
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on amount of use as opposed to a flat monthly rate. While volume-based
rates result in higher costs to United States users, 18 they offer significant
advantages to PTTs over flat tariff rates. Volume-sensitive rates increase
revenues since large-volume users pay more than with flat monthly rates.
Volume-sensitive pricing also provides for equal distribution of revenue
among the several nations through which a private network passes.
For example, when SWIFT, 19 the interbank clearance network, decided
in 1976 to implement a private line packet network rather than continuing
to rely on the more expensive telex, 20 the PTTs were unwilling to accept
this loss of revenue, and denied service to SWIFT at the established
monthly rates. 21 The European Conference of Postal and Telecommunica-
tions Administrations (CEPT), 22 the organization comprised of all the
European PTTs, imposed a volume-sensitive tariff surcharge, which en-
sured a more equal distribution of the revenues among the PTTs. Under
the flat rate system, the nations where the major switching centers were
located (Belgium and the Netherlands) would have received most of the
income. 23 Many private line users protested the SWIFT decision, seeing
it as a harmful precedent justifying restriction or exclusion of private
packet networks. 24
Volume-sensitive tariffs are also better suited for preventing the unau-
thorized use of lines which takes place through resale and sharing by users.
With volume-sensitive tariff rates, PTTs can monitor the exact flow of data
and retain control over use of their lines. In addition, volume-sensitive
rates eliminate user incentives to develop faster ways of pushing data
through telecommunications lines, thus reducing burdens for which the
circuit and network were not designed. 25 In 1972 prices were changed so
that the flat rate charge for a private international line used by a single
customer became 83 percent of the shared line rate. 26 European PTTs also
imposed volume-based pricing as a surcharge on multi-user networks to
discourage sharing. 27
Volume-sensitive rates provide a greater return on investment than flat
rates. For example, many new public networks utilize a volume rate, claim-
ing that flat rates do not provide a return on investment sufficient to
finance new technological investments which would benefit the public.
With flat monthly rates, some large specialized users are, in effect, subsi-
dized by smaller users. 28 Volume-sensitive rates not only boost those
domestic users who operate at a competitive disadvantage under the flat
rates, 29 but also attract new users who formerly could not afford interna-
tional data communications with small traffic volumes.
Although few PTTs have implemented Volume rates for all telecom-
munication services, a few countries have taken concrete steps in this
direction. Japan's Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) instituted rates
based on transmission speed, and later established a volume-sensitive
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service, "Venus." 30 In Europe, both France and West Germany have public
networks utilizing volume-sensitive rates. West Germany's Bundespost
had announced that it would eliminate private line access upon the incep-
tion of its new volume sensitive public service. Although Germany did not
eliminate private leased lines, it did restrict private line access by increasing
private line rates and imposing other restrictions. 31
Public Network Takeovers
A second type of restriction on private leased lines results when a nation
develops its own public telecommunications network and then encourages
or forces private leased line traffic to use this network. Currently Japan,
France, Germany, Great Britain,3 2 Spain, Austria, and the Nordic na-
tions 33 have instituted public data networks. In addition, the European
Communities (EC) have sponsored a continent-wide network, Euronet.
A number of the countries with public networks have moved to incor-
porate private leased line users into the public network. These public
network "takeovers" are motivated by a desire to ensure an efficient and
profitable network and to gain direct control over all facets of telecom-
munications policy. In order to increase traffic on public networks, PTTs
either have denied private leased line access or have increased tariffs and
restrictions to the point that users switch to the public network. The
French "telematique" plan is a good example of this latter technique. 34
The French plan, which includes selective telecommunications tariffs
and regulations such as a tariff on business information, 35 has produced
a public value-added network for business customers, TRANSPAC, utiliz-
ing packet switching technology and volume-based rates. Due to the high
initial investment required by TRANSPAC, the French PTT predictably
raised tariffs on private leased lines to match those of the public net-
work, 36 and traffic has shifted to TRANSPAC. 3 7
Japan provides a clear example of the control which a telecommunica-
tions authority can gain over national and international telecommunica-
tions through government planning. Japan has domestic public switched
data networks and is linking an international packet switching network
with a domestic one. 38 United States users and service providers have
faced many problems, delays and refusals regarding leased line access.
Thus American service providers and equipment manufacturers vigorously
opposed the grant of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) operat-
ing authority to the international record carriers (IRCs) for the Japanese
"Venus" service because of fears that private leased line service would be
eliminated in Japan. 39
Public network takeovers enjoy popular support in European countries.
Not only do local telecommunications service and equipment industries
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benefit, but small users who cannot afford to lease private lines gain access
to sophisticated telecommunications services. In addition, a greater variety
of services are available to users at potentially lower costs. 40
Popular support for public networks suggests that public network take-
overs may increase. If so, the cost of telecommunications services could
significantly increase. United States corporations predict that if they are
forced into public networks, large cost increases will result from duplica-
tion of equipment and loss of efficiency. They also predict a stifling of
technological development and a decrease in the quality of computer ser-
vices. 41
Other Restrictions
Other restrictions on private leased lines making their use difficult or
expensive include imposing local equipment requirements or communica-
tions standards which are not compatible with American-made products.
Service requirements similarly discourage United States users of private
leased lines. For example, Japan has conditioned service on connection
with only one computer center in the United States. 42 West Germany now
conditions private line availability on utilization of local West German
data processing facilities, thus boosting the local data processing industry
and forcing companies which cannot afford to relocate processing opera-
tions to transfer traffic to the more expensive usage-sensitive services, or
to leave the country altogether. 43 Some nations, including the Nordic
group, are attempting to restrict business to a single foreign correspondent
in the United States. 44
THE CLIMATE FOR ABOLITION OF PRIVATE LEASED LINES
Although PTTs have taken actions which threaten the availability of pri-
vate leased lines, there are other factors which work in the opposite direc-
tion. The future status of private leased lines will be determined not only
by the differing motivations of the various nations, but by larger forces
such as the impact and direction of European coordination. The changing
balance of telecommunications power and the role played by the United
States will also affect what PTTs will do.
European Cooperation
One factor which affects the climate for the abolition of private leased lines
is European coordination of telecommunication policy, which can either
help or hinder the American users and suppliers. Some developments in
224 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Europe suggest that European coordination may lead to more restrictions
on international telecommunications and the possible elimination of pri-
vate leased lines. For example, the CEPT provides the possibility of united
PTT action to eliminate private data networks, as seen in the SWIFT
example. In addition, Italy, with the support of some other countries, 4s has
urged the CCITT to discourage the introduction of new private leased
lines. 46
Perhaps the most alarming development which seemingly anticipates
the elimination of private leased lines has been the establishment of Euro-
net, a continent-wide network to which American companies have only
limited access. 47 Euronet has reportedly excluded computer service com-
panies which are not from EEC countries, and two American vendors of
data bases were excluded from Euronet because they used computers
located outside of Europe. 48 By using Euronet, nations can avoid reliance
on United States telecommunications service providers and revenues, and
will be freer to deny private leased line access.
There are signs, however, that some European organizations wish to
encourage a "free market system" in telecommunications, and thus contin-
ue to offer leased line access. For example, a CCITT Working Party 49
announced that administrations should continue to provide international
private leased telecommunications circuits and network service. 5 0 In addi-
tion, the Commission of the European Communities ruled in December
1982 that British Telecom could not continue to prohibit private operators
from retransmitting international data. sl The action of the EC Commis-
sioners to bar this restraint of trade suggests that they might also take
action on other restrictive telecommunication policies under the EC an-
timonopoly laws. S2
Some observers doubt, however, that the EC antimonopoly laws can
serve to eliminate restrictive telecommunication policies since their ap-
plication to other industries has been successfully resisted by some mem-
ber nations. 53 Moreover, it is the European Communities which are
sponsoring Euronet, a network which is itself a monopoly. 54 Already there
are signs that PiTs do not wish to participate fully in the development of
Euronet. For example, the CEPT members are now concentrating on bilat-
eral interconnection of public switched data networks. 55 It seems that the
PTTs hope to capture international data traffic from private networks and
Euronet. 5
6
Given the conflicting trends for and against restrictive telecommunica-
tions policies in the context of European organizations, it is unclear wheth-
er or not private leased lines will be abolished. Regional and international
cooperation on the part of PTTs is potentially disastrous for American
users who desire private leased line access. On the other hand, regional and
international action can moderate the more restrictive telecommunications
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practices of individual European countries, such as France. Since the major
threat to users comes from individual nations acting in their own self-
interests, American users would benefit from European solidarity and
cooperation which limits unilateral anticompetitive actions. The United
States government should thus encourage European free market policies. 57
Protectionism and National Sovereignty Concerns
A major motivating factor behind PTr restrictions of private leased lines
is the desire to prevent the resale and sharing of telecommunications lines,
since these practices cause the PTTs to lose revenues and control of line
use. The CCITT Recommendations prohibit the sharing or resale of inter-
national telecommunications services by users other than government ad-
ministrations and recognized private operating agencies (RPOAs). 
5 8
To minimize the loss of revenue and control over lines caused by sharing
and resale, and in reaction to violations of CCITT prohibitions by Ameri-
can users, the PTTs want to reduce the appeal of resale and sharing by
increasing the applicable rental rates or by taking other steps which might
lead to the elimination of private leased lines. 59
The response of total abolition of private leased lines is arguably au-
thorized under the CCITT Recommendations: "Administrations shall
refuse to provide an international private leased circuit when the cus-
tomer's proposed activity would be regarded as an infringement of the
functions of the Administration in providing telecommunications services
to others," 6 0 and "[iln the event of a violation of these provisions, Ad-
ministrations reserve the right to cancel the lease." 
61
According to the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
(ADAPSO), foreign PTTs have consistently held that any user of interna-
tional private line service who provides any type of telecommunications
service-including enhanced services-to others is in violation of national
and international regulations, and is subject to penalties such as the dis-
continuation of service. 62 Hong Kong's Cable and Wireless Ltd. 63 recom-
mended to the CCITT 6 that private line service should continue to be
available only to customers "using leased circuits for their own traffic,"
emphasizing their concern with erosion of public traffic which increases
costs to remaining public customers. 
65
Economic protectionism is another motivating factor which lies behind
many of the private leased line restrictions. In part, this stems from strong
national sovereignty feelings and a desire to avoid reliance on foreign
telecommunications or data processing. 66 In addition, some nations fear
the effect of new information technologies on domestic employment, 
6 7
while in countries where new telecommunications industries have devel-
oped, restrictions are employed to promote the domestic telecommunica-
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tions industry. For example, when Japanese users showed a preference for
United States-made modems 68 in 1978, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph
(NTT) cut incentives to buy the American equipment by raising the rate
for bare leased data circuits to that of NTT-operated circuits, which came
equipped with NTT-supplied modems. 69
Reliance on United States Investment
Although desires to gain more control over telecommunications, increase
revenues, and encourage domestic telecommunications and data service
industries could lead European countries to deny access to private leased
lines, other factors suggest that private leased lines will not be abolished.
Perhaps the most important factor is that these nations rely on American
investment in general, and American investment in telecommunications in
particular.
Since PTTs are aware of the possibility that increased tariff rates and
other restrictions may force users to abandon private networks, they are
less likely to take steps leading to such abandonment to the extent they
rely on American investment. Also, because multinational corporations
prefer to locate their database and central information processing system
in countries with lower leased line charges and reliable service, the United
States may attract European business as the divergence in American-Euro-
pean line rates increases. This would, in turn, favor American computer
systems and equipment manufacturers at the expense of the Europeans. 70
Although the desire for United States investment may prevent PTTs from
totally eliminating private leased line access, it does not seem to be a check
on rental rate increases.
Lack of Unified American Voice
The lack of a single policy voice prevents the United States from exerting
its political power in the international telecommunications arena, allowing
PTT actions to go unchecked. In the CCITT the United States does not
present consistent positions on issues, unlike the PTTs, which often unite
to pass Recommendations and Resolutions favorable to their interests. For
example, American users strongly wish to preserve their flat monthly rates,
whereas the IRCs, now involved in providing intercontinental services
with volume-based pricing, sometimes share the views of the PTTs. 71
In the past, a complaint to the FCC was the only means by which
American users could protest any aspect of international telecommunica-
tions services, including PTT practices. 72 Mandated to serve "the public
interest" and bombarded by special interest groups, especially the IRCs,
the FCC rarely would take action to eliminate the restrictive effects of
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foreign regulations. 73 Although the FCC claims it is committed to ensuring
the continued availability of private leased lines, users complain that its
infrequent responses frustrate this purported goal.
For example, despite strong opposition to its authorization of volume-
sensitive services by computer manufacturers and users, in 1977 the FCC
authorized a volume-sensitive public data communications service be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom, 74 and the next year
authorized three IRCs to initiate volume-sensitive data services between
the United States and Hong Kong. 75 ADAPSO and the Computer and
Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) had urged the
FCC to condition any new services upon the continuing availability of
private leased lines, 76 but the FCC dismissed these concerns, stating in the
United States-United Kingdom service dispute that "[t]he Commission
recognizes the technical and economical advantages to large volume users
inherent in the use of overseas private line services. Such services cannot
be curtailed without appropriate authorization pursuant to Section 214." 77
In the Hong Kong case, however, the FCC states that it could control only
United States carriers and "could not force foreign correspondents to pro-
vide matching halves of particular circuits, or services which we would
require the American carriers to provide now, or in the future." 78 Perhaps
because of inconsistent FCC actions, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative is now more actively initiating negotiations and transmit-
ting users' complaints. 79
The American government, however, has not maintained a consistent
public position on many private leased line issues. For example, a United
States position paper to the CCITT in 1978 responding to the Italian
delegation's proposal stated: "[i]t is the USA's firm position that leased
circuits charged on a flat monthly rental basis remain available to all users
who require them." 8 0 In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. to deregulate
resale and shared use by IRC's, however, the FCC extolls the benefits of
usage-sensitive pricing:
since the elimination of current tariff restrictions on the use of service will
lead to greater emphasis on the underlying costs as a basis for setting rates,
impetus may be given to the adoption of pricing techniques, e.g., usage-sensitive
pricing, whereby all users would pay for the actual telecommunications
capacity utilized, regardless of the particular application, with the result that
the opportunity for arbitrage will ultimately be eliminated. This will give
consumers the opportunity to select more accurately the lowest priced ser-
vice that adequately meets their communications needs. 81
Not only has United States policy been inconsistent, but at times it is
also insensitive to the effects it has on both American telecommunications
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users and foreign PTrs. For example, both American and foreign parties
have strongly objected to the FCC's decision of August 1982 permitting
"enhanced" services to be provided internationally without regulation. 82
The decision applies the Second Computer Inquiry (Computer I) 83 principles of
deregulation to international services. American multinational corpora-
tions, data processing companies and some IRCs oppose the decision. They
argue that permitting such "enhanced services" will lead foreign PTTs to
stop offering flat-rate leased channel service. 
84
The FCC announced that this international application of Computer II
does not approve de facto resale and shared use and that, pending a decision
in the international resale proceeding, 8 5 current IRC tariff restrictions
against third-party use are still in force. 86 The PTTs, however, were not
reassured by such statements. 87 West Germany threatened strong action
if resale and shared use results from the decision; 88 the Director of the
CCITT also warned of adverse PTT reactions. 89 The resale controversy is
an example of how private leased line restrictions may be used as an
economic and political response to American deregulatory policy. The
reactions of the Europeans may cause the FCC to reconsider its position
on this specific issue, and should cause it more generally to consider, prior
to making such decisions, their impact on foreign as well as domestic
parties.
CONCLUSION
At present, actions taken by the PTTs and, to a lesser extent, the American
government, can strongly affect the availability of private leased lines.
Three scenarios are possible: first, the PTTs may refrain from further
curtailment of leased line availability as the deregulatory movement
spreads and foreign markets open to competition; second, PTTs may in-
creasingly discourage leased line use by employing and expanding current
restrictive practices; and third, PTTs which need not rely on private leased
line revenues, and with established public networks, may abolish private
lines altogether. The second, middle option is most likely since rate in-
creases generate revenues and also help shift traffic to public networks.
Even this option could, however, lead to de facto elimination of private
leased lines, since the effects of these continuing restrictions on American
users can be severe.
Indirect effects of private leased line restrictions include restraints on
free flow of information and world trade. 90 The direct effects of restric-
tions are felt in the United States not only by users of private leased lines,
but by American equipment manufacturers and service providers as
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well. 91 United States telecommunications investments abroad are report-
edly declining due to operational uncertainty. 
92
In order to ameliorate this situation, the United States government
needs to reconsider its international telecommunications policies, which it
seems to be beginning to do. 93 A strong American stance against foreign
protectionist measures which restrict private leased line access would
greatly benefit users. The United States also needs to clarify its policies
regarding competition and IRCs, mindful of the dangers of attempting to
impose deregulatory principles on other nations, and with a concern for
American users who require international private leased line access. By
working with other nations in international organizations and appreciating
their concerns, the United States can do much to enhance the growth of
international telecommunications, encouraging the participation of all na-
tions while ensuring fair treatment for American users.
NOTES
I A private leased line is a communication circuit which is "dedicated," or reserved
permanently for a single user, unlike switched circuits which service many users. "Public
network" refers to a government-operated system. Computer data is now transmitted by
satellite, as well as by terrestrial line and submarine cable; the term "private line" encom-
passes all methods. The three primary means of international data communication are leased
lines, the switched telephone network, and special purpose data transmission lines, of which
leased lines are the most important. Chamoux, Economic Considerations on International Communica-
tions, in Policy Implications of Data Networks in the OECD Area 140,141 (OECD series on Information
Computer Communication Policy 1980) [hereinafter cited as Poucy ImPuCAiAoNs]. See generally
Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transborder Data Flows: Privacy Protection or Non-Tariff Barriers?, 10 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1055 (1978).
Government telecommunications monopolies (PTfs) (see infra note 5) began leasing their
telecommunications lines at flat monthly rates as computer technology advanced and users
desired access to lines, with PTTs unable or unwilling to develop adequate public services.
When it became clear that the bulk of data transmission was via private leased lines (rather
than public telephone systems) the PTTs became alarmed, fearing a loss of control and
revenue through transborder data flows, and began efforts to curtail or discourage the use of
private lines. Technology and equipment have now advanced so that administrations can
operate sophisticated public networks, creating competition for and threatening the existence
of private leased lines.
2 This article is limited to computer-generated data flows, as distinct from TELEX, voice
telephony, or video. The definition offered by Eric Novotny is easily understood: "Transbor-
der data flows are units of information coded electronically for processing by one or more
digital computers which transfer or process the information in more than one nation-state."
Novotny, Transborder Data Rows and International Law: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16
STAN. J. IN-r'T L. 141, 143-4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Novotny, Framework]. See generally
Novotny, Transborder Data Flow Regulation: Technical Issues of Legal Concern, 3 COMPUTER/LAw J. 105,
110-12 (1981).
3 More than 3,500 international private line circuits are being leased by the U.S. govern-
ment and multinational private businesses. ADAPSO statement in 48 TELEcoM. REP., Sept. 27,
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1982, at 5. The public sector is a large user of international lines, e.g., police networks
(Interpol), security systems (NATO), technical cooperation systems (weather, medical re-
search, etc.). Shickich, Transborder Data Flow, 11 LAW & COMPUTER TECH. (1978), reprinted in, CS
50-815 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 101, 102 (1979).
The major United States users from the private sector are banks, multinational corpora-
tions, and computer service companies. Many multinational corporations rely on computer
data transmissions in controlling production, distribution, finances, and personnel. Their
information systems are in some cases organized around distributed processing networks, but
more commonly involve a concentrated computing center in the home country which serves
satellite branches. Id.
G.E. (Mark Il), Control Data Corporation (Cybernet), Computer Science Corporation
(Infonet), Tymshare, Inc., and Tymnet are large networks offering services such as data
processing and message switching. Data processing involves a transformation or manipula-
tion of the data into a superior form, unlike mere data communications. Private data networks
combined with data processing "service bureaus" create "value-added networks" such as SBS
and XTN in the United States. Id. at n.45.
4 Information-intensive industries are suffering most from high tariffs on private lines.
These include direct mail companies, travel and entertainment industries, insurance and
employment services, and banking firms. Novotny, Framework, supra note 2, at 155. In several
of these areas, members of an industry have combined to form multi-user leased-line net-
works: SITA (Societe Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautiques) for airline reser-
vations and SWIFT (Society for World Interbank Financial Telecommunications), the
interbank clearance network, are examples.
Computer service companies, such as data processing systems and remote computing
companies, are rapidly growing but face substantial barriers to international growth in na-
tions restricting transborder data flows.
5 Most nations have government-owned monopolies which control telecommunications.
The Japanese counterpart of the European PTT for domestic service is Nippon Telephone and
Telegraph (NTT), a central communications authority which is the domestic carrier and
largest supplier of computer services in Japan. International service in Japan is provided by
a separate private corporation, Kokusai Kenshir Demva Co., Ltd. (KDD). The Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications oversees both.
6 Underlying the arguments of both sides of the debate over the desirability of restricting
access to private leased lines are fundamental differences in economic and political theory.
Principles of equality clash with efficiency, the welfare state with free enterprise and laissez-
faire principles, regulation with open market competition, and national sovereignty with
international cooperation. These differences will be discussed only briefly as they relate to
the specific issues raised in the text, but their fundamental importance should not be forgot-
ten.
7 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. See generally, Feketekuty, Restrictions on Trade
in Communication and Information Services, this volume.
8 European private leased lines are unduly expensive. Hughes and Sasson, The Usage of
International Data Networks in Europe, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 1, at 30. The annual line
rentals for the networks studied by these authors in 1977 varied from 100,000 to 500,000
dollars, and the total cost of operating a private network was between twice and five times
the line rental amount. Id. John Eger, former director of the Office of Telecommunications
Policy, stated in 1978 that the PTTs "price their facilities at rates and schedules that are
prohibitive for the development of private or user-controlled data networks." Eger, supra note
1, at 1080. The most widely-discussed problem among international data transmission spe-
cialists is now the problem of costs. Chamoux, supra note 1, at 151. See also HoUsE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL. INFORMATION FLOW: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R.
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Doc. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1980) (citing examples of "excess and discrimina-
tory tariff and pricing practices") [hereinafter cited as INT'L INFO. FLOW].
U.S.-based corporations accustomed to uniform domestic rates express surprise at the
disparities in private line tariff rates among European countries, and at the private circuit rates
themselves, which are much higher than prices for comparable services in the U.S. Reasons
for the higher European rates include the monopoly position of the foreign carrier and the
dependence of some governments on their telecommunications revenues. Telecommunications
and Information Industries-nternational Trade Role: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 157
(1981) (statement of B.C. Burgess, Director, Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, Bank of
America) (hereinafter cited as Telecommunications Hearings ). It was noted that the 1972 Eurodata
revealed that there are ten times as many remote data terminals in the United States as in
Europe, and that "[o]ne can wonder if it is a complete coincidence that the price charged for
data communications facilities in the U.S.A. is approximately one tenth of that charged in
Europe." L. Smulian, Commission of the European Communities, 1975 OECD Computer/
Telecommunications Policy Conference, quoted in Gassman, New International Policy Implications of
the Growth of Transborder Data flows, in TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
51, 59 (OECD series on Information Computer Communication Policy 1979).
9 The ITU is a permanent organ of the UN, with 153 current member nations. The CCITT,
one of its consultative committees, meets in plenary assembly to approve Recommendations
and Regulations, the most recent of which appear in CCITT, General Tariff Principles, in ISDN
STuDy (1981) [hereinafter cited as YELLOW BOOK], published following Plenary Assembly VII
in 1981, Geneva. The Orange Book, 1977, contains the prior rules. Study Group III is responsible
for tariff principles, which appear in Series D of the Recommendations, Volume I.1.
10 PTTs establish their own monthly rates and share of the rates charged for interconti-
nental circuits. CCITT Rec. D.3 §§ 1.2, 2.1, in YELLow BooK, supra note 9. CCITT Rec. D.3 §
1.3 states that intercontinental rates should reflect, among other factors, the cost of providing
the service and the need to harmonize leased circuit charges with corresponding public service
rates.
U.S. intercontinental communications operate through international record carriers
(IRCs), which contract with individual PTTs. The IRCs are "Administrations" for CCITT
purposes. "Administration" refers to both telecommunications administrations and recog-
nized private operating agencies (RPOAs). CCITT Note, in YELLOW BOOK supra note 9, at VII.
To date the authorized IRCs are RCA Global Communications, Inc., ITT World Communica-
tions, Inc., and Western Union International, Inc., which are the three largest, plus TRT
Telecommunications Corp., FTC Communications, Inc., and U.S.-Liberia Radio Corporation.
International record carriers originally handled all "record" communications (data, tele-
graph, facsimile) as opposed to voice communications, from and to the few authorized U.S.
gateways. See In re International Record Carriers Scope of Operations, 76 F.C.C.2d 115 (1980)
(Federal Communications Commission authorized IRCs to use additional cities as gateways).
AT&T was restricted to voice services, and Western Union provided domestic record services.
The oligopoly of the IRCs authorized by the FCC to provide overseas record service was
initially protected from price competition, and the IRCs were required to charge identical
tariffs. Chamoux, supra note 1, at 151. Now, however, the FCC is pursuing a deregulatory
policy and encouraging a competitive market, predicting better and cheaper telecommunica-
tion services for the public. The FCC has authorized the IRCs to compete in the domestic
market, and has allowed their customers to send voice communications and AT&T customers
to send record communications. See Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations Barriers to the Trans-
border flow of Information, 14 CoRNEsLL INT'L L.J. 287, 289-93 (1981). Although the IRCs are
regulated by the FCC, this agency exerts no meaningful influence over tariff rates, given its
lack of power over foreign correspondents and its current deregulatory mood.
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11 After an extensive study, Prof. Chamoux concludes that "the principles on which
international leased line tariffs are determined are far too complex to be properly understood
by the general public," and that "these tariffs produce anomolies which the businessman,
accustomed to some basic minimum of economic reasoning, finds difficult to accept." Cha-
moux, supra note 1, at 146. CCITT Rec. D.2 sets a rental basis of 9,000 minutes per month
for continental telecommunications circuits. Rec. D.2, § 1.2, in YELLOW BOOK, supra note 9.
Point-to-point transmissions and single-user private networks are charged at the lower rate
of 7500 minutes.
12 See Chamoux, supra note 1, at 148. This coefficient can be between 1 and 1.8 for
transborder data flows within the same continent. CCITT Rec. D.2, § 1.2, in YELLOW BooK,
supra note 9. See Rec. D.300 R, Section 3.3, on "factor K" for telephone lines.
13 Chamoux, supra note I at 141-44; Eger, supra note I at 1080, citing 1978 statistics of Louis
Pouzin that the cost per mile of a European leased telephone line was three-to-five times
higher for international links than for domestic ones.
14 The maximum tariff recommended for the national extension is twenty gold centimes.
CCITT Rec. D.300 R, in YELLOW BooK, supra note 9. Germany's Bundepost (the telephone
utility) has refused to comply with this limit. Chamoux, supra note 1, at 148. Although the
Recommendations are not binding, they are followed faithfully when there is strong necessity
for cooperation. Such is the case with technical standards, for which the CCITT sets intercon-
nection specifications. The complex system of accounting between nations for transborder
telecommunications is also largely followed.
15 CCITT Rec. D.5, para. 2, in YELLOW BooK, supra note 9.
16 "[F]or political or social reasons the rates for certain services may be so arranged that
they do not cover all the costs involved." Id. at Rec. D.5, para. 1.
17 CCITT Rec. D.5 states that the income from the totality of services provided should
cover all costs, and that "for political or social reasons.., the overall balance in the telecom-
munication services required should be achieved by applying an "increase factor" to leased
line rates in order to subsidize public services. Id. at Rec. D.5, para. 2.
18 Volume-based rates are said to favor small and infrequent users, such as local European
users, and harm the large-volume users such as U.S. multinational corporations and data
service networks; this technological improvement is thus seen as serving the goals of the
P is. See Hirsch, Italian Connection: Tariffs Based on Volume Worry U.S. Companies, 24 DATANATION
194 (1978); Gassman, supra note 8, at 58. Many users prefer increased fiat monthly rates to
the imposition of volume-based rates. Some large users, however, would welcome volume-
based rates as a reasonable alternative to the total elimination of private lines. See Eger, The
Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 CORNELL Irr'L L.J. 203, 220 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Eger, Global Phenomenon ], especially as recently-increased fiat monthly rates
approach the costs of volume based tariffs. Allen & Tenkhoff, An Overview of Transborder Data
Flow Issues: Report of the AFIPS Panel on Transborder Data low, 1 TRAINSBORDEi DATA FLows: CONCERNS
IN PIVACY PROTECTION AND FR E FLOW O1 INFORMATION 27 (R. Turn ed. 1979) (hereinafter cited
as AFIPS REPORT).
Several commentators claim that volume-based rates need not necessarily harm users. In
fact, technological improvement in the computer field may enable large users of international
leased lines to avoid much of the impact of volume-sensitive rates. Users could install "data
compression equipment capable of decreasing the bits actually transmitted to a point where
the charge for each message sent ... was less than ... under the present fiat-rate pricing
scheme." Hirsh at 195. Commentators Pool and Solomon claim: "volume-sensitive rates are
likely to end up being good for the computer industry, less good for telecommunications
equipment manufacturers, and no better for the carriers who will carry less traffic at higher
returns per bit . . ." while costs for large users will probably "end up as no different once
[the users] have gone through the trauma of a major change." Pool and Solomon, Transborder
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Data Flows: Requirements for International Co-operation, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 1, 79 at 107.
In the short term, however, this "trauma" is not easy for the users to accept.
19 SWIFT services the international payments and financial data needs of 239 member
banks of the United States, Canada, and Europe.
20 With a private network, a company's cost of transmission is much less than when using
international telex. The Hughes and Sasson study, supra note 8 at 30, shows transmission costs
of one to ten cents for 1,000 characters transmitted by private network, as compared with
sixty cents for international telex in Europe. Also compared are proposed tariffs for several
public networks, of approximately 1 cent per 1,000.
Packet switching breaks down a stream of data into packets which can be sent by different
routes to a destination. CCITT Recommendation X.25, YELLOW BOOx, supra note 9, provides
standards for packet switching networks. See also YELLow Boox, id. at Recs. X.3, X.28, X.29,
X.75.
21 Pool and Solomon, The Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 3 TELECOM. POL'Y 176, 190
(1979). The new SWIFT rates were predicted to increase the cost of intra-European bank
communications by a factor of four and transatlantic message costs by a factor of ten. Hirsch,
supra note 18, at 197; Bigelow, European Users Demand Changes in Telecommunications, 5 COMPUTER
L. SEry. (Callaghan), § 9-6, at 3.
22 The CEPT is the twenty-six member body of European PITs governed by a biennial
plenary conference and two permanent commissions. It provides a bloc of European solidarity
to the ITU, and was very active, in conjunction with the EEC, in planning Euronet. See
Delchier, The European Conference of Postal Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT and the Development
of Data Networks, in PoLIcY IMuLCATIONS, supra note 1 at 160. Its interests may now be conflicting
with those of Euronet; see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
23 Bigelow, supra note 21, at 1, 3. See Markoski, supra note 10, at 298-99.
24 Pool and Solomon, supra note 18, at 107. For example, the PTTs decided to apply the
new volume-sensitive rates to other specialized multi-user networks also, such as the Societi
Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA). Lamond, The U.K. Telecommuni-
cations Monopoly, 3 TELECOM. PoL'y 209, 214-15 (1979). The Italian delegation at the 1977 CCITT
meeting in Geneva proposed imposing volume-sensitive pricing not only on the specialized
service networks but on all private leased circuits, including single-users. CCITT Study
Group I1, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. Com.-No. 6-E (Feb. 1977) (Italian Adminis-
tration). See Markoski, supra note 10, at 302-04.
25 Larsson, Summary of Session 1, Discussion of Areas of Concern and the Need for OECD-Wide
Consultation, in POLICY IMPUCATIONS, supra note 1, at 190.
26 Hirsch, supra note 18, at 197.
27 E.g., the SWIFT decision, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
28 Larsson, Introduction, Data Network Plans and Developments, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note
1, at 23.
29 In determining the "increase factor" which may be applied to leased line rates in order
to subsidize public services, the CCITT states that "the value of the service rendered to the
user should be taken into consideration." CCITT Rec. D.5, para. 2, in YELLOW Boox, supra note
9.
30 For background on "Venus" and the dispute before the FCC over the U.S.-Japan
service, see Feldman and Garcia, National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 7 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
Com. REG. 1, 4-7 (1982).
31 Sanger, Waging a Trade War over Data, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1980, at 1F, col. 2. The article
reports that private leased line rates will increase 600 percent by 1988.
32 See Reid, Prestel, the British Post Office Viewdata Service, in PoLIcY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 1,
at 40. See also Hughes and Sasson, supra note 8, at 30, for information concerning the new EPSS
international public data network.
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33 The Nordic Public Data Network is an international value-added network (like Euro-
net). Recently, interconnection between West European public networks and Eastern Euro-
pean socialist countries through the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has
expanded the "transnational telecommunication infrastructure." UNESCO Commission on
Transnational Corporations, 7th Session, Transnational Corporations and Transborder Data
Flows: An Overview, Report of the Secretariat at 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/87 (1981).
34 The term "telematique," which describes the convergence of telecommunications and
data-processing technologies, was first used by Simon Nora and Alain Minc in their influen-
tial report, L Informatization de la Societe 17 (1978). This report provided the underpinnings for
France's telecommunications development plan. Eger, GLOBAL PHENOMENON, supra note 18, at
206 n.12.
35 Eger, GLOBAL PHENOMENON, supra note 18. Eger states that this will allow the French to
gain an important economic advantage over the U.S. in the information market, even though
some of these schemes are "unlikely to crystallize in any real sense ... in the near term."
ISSUEs IN INmEAnoN INFORMATION, WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS II, 48 (Media Institute ed. 1982)
(statement of John Eger, V.P., Strategic & International Development, CBS, Inc.), [hereinafter
cited as WORKSHOP].
36 As predicted by Lamond, supra note 24, at 213-14. Tariffs must be set high to enable
a packet switching network to break even at low volume.
37 Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 8, at 157.
38 Oka, Data Network Developments and Policies in Japan in PoucY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 1, at
61. The domestic networks include circuit switching and packet switching. See also Pool and
Solomon, supra note 18, at 88; Feldman and Garcia, supra note 30 at 4.
39 Feldman and Garcia, supra note 30 at 3-7, relates the troubles of Tymshare and Control
Data in gaining access to leased lines in Japan. The FCC ordered commencement of the
volume-sensitive service (Venus) on a temporary basis and has continued to grant extensions.
Id. at 6.
40 D.W. DAVIES, D. BECKER, W.T. PRICE, and SOLOMIDES, COMPUTER NETWORS AND THEI
PROTOCOLS, 23-26 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DAVIES]. Public networks can also provide access
to a variety of other new users, as communication becomes vital between increasingly inter-
dependent nations. Given the engineering economies and more enforceable standards of
public networks, public networks may be able to offer better performance. Id.
41 48 TELECOM. RaP. No. 39, at 6 (1982); Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 8, at 61, 86
(prepared statement of Geza Feketekuty); Markoski, supra note 10, at 307 (ADAPSO petition).
A stifling of the development of remote access computing services is also predicted. Markoski
at 300 n.62.
Since a public network balances many competing needs, its users must sacrifice the highly
valued individualized control and flexibility which private leased lines provide and which
make possible technological innovations and sophisticated systems. Id.; Hirsch, supra note 18,
at 198.
42 See Feldman and Garda, supra note 30, at 4 and n.13, regarding restrictions imposed
on Control Data and Tymshare. Control Data reports a $33,000 monthly charge for its
U.S.-Tokyo private leased line, which operates at only 10 percent capacity due to Japanese
restrictions. Block, Transborder Data flows: Barriers to the Free flow of Information, 28 INFOSYSTEMS No.
9, 108, 110 (1981).
43 Markoski, supra note 10, at 317-19. Regulations were announced in 1978, to become
effective January 1, 1982, requiring in effect that remote access data processors could not do
business in Germany unless they performed data processing there, and international leased
lines are available only under guarantee that they are not used to transmit unprocessed data
to foreign telecommunications networks. TELECOMMUNICATIONS HEARINGS, supra note 8, at 87, 89
(prepared statement of Geza Feketekuty, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative) and at 157
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(statement of B.C. Burgess); Eger, GLOBAL PHENOMENON, supra note 18 at 221; Feldman and
Garcia, supra note 30, at 7-8.
44 The five Nordic nations requested bids from seven U.S. IRCs for provision of enhanced
data services under an exclusive agreement. The IRCs complied with the FCC request to defer
bidding pending review and formulation of U.S. government response. 48 Telecom. Rep. 39,
3-5 (1982).
See Friedan, The International Application* of the Second Computer Inquiry, this volume, for an
explanation of how FCC application of Computer II internationally will lead PTTs to restrict
the number of foreign correspondents. The U.S. Congress attempted to secure access to
foreign locales for carriers without operating agreements with PTTs by enacting the Record
Carrier Competition Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-130, 95 Stat. 1687 (1981). See 47 U.S.C. §
222(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1981), which requires record carriers to make interconnection avail-
able to other carriers on request, and § 222(c)(1)(A)(ii) which guarantees a right to a distribu-
tion of inbound traffic proportionate to the volume of outbound traffic generated.
45 CCITT Study Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM III-No. 6-E (Feb.
1977) (Italian Administration) cited in Eger, Global Phenomenon, supra note 18, at 219 n.82.
46 The provision was ultimately rejected. Id. at 219, n.83. The idea of restricting private
leased line access may appeal to nations solely because US entities are major users of these
lines. Third-world countries have charged the US with "electronic colonialism." European
nations cooperate and share technological developments with third-world countries in the
ITU in an effort to challenge the position of the US in telecommunications. The Intergovern-
mental Bureau of Informatics (IBI), which was established in 1961 under UN auspices by an
International Convention, has been increasingly active in efforts to change the distribution
of power and resources in the telecommunications field in favor of developing nations.
47 The European Community (EC) sponsored Euronet which opened in 1979 under the
implementation and planning of the nine EEC PTrs and Switzerland. Whyte, Uncharted Waters
for Telecommunications, 49 TELECOM. J. 239, 242 (1982). The Commission of the EC was formally
responsible for execution of the plan, while the Council of Ministers and the Parliament
shared authority over the budget. Anderla, The Impact of Euronet and its Related Developments, in
PoLIcY IMPLIcATIONs, supra note 1, at 168. The Commission of the EC plans to extend Euronet
throughout and beyond Europe, interconnecting with other networks. Remarks by S. Wein-
stein (American Express Corporation) at Transborder Data Flow Seminar (Feb. 11, 1982),
reprinted in Naw TcHoLoGY AND TwoSBORDER DATA FLows 2. According to one spokesman,
Euronet serves "[European] host computers at $5.00 per hour, whereas our customers are
charged $20.00-$30.00 per hour to access our service by local PTTs." Isrr'L INFO. FLOW, supra
note 8, at 14 n.19 (quoting a letter from R. Summit, Director, Information Systems, Dialog
Retrieval Service). See generally Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge of the New Information
Technologies: A Teleinformatics Strategy for the 1980's, 14 CORNELL IN'L L.J. 237 (1981).
48 Feldman and Garcia, supra note 30, at 7 n.32; Markoski, supra note 10, at 319 n.158.
49 The CCITT has specialty committees called "Study Groups" which are further broken
down into "Working Parties" which develop proposals.
50 The group concluded that the Telegraph and Telephone Regulations require the provi-
sion of leased channel service. CCITT Study Group Ill, Report on the Meeting Held in Geneva
From I to 3 May, 1978, Doc. COM Ill-No. 51-E, at 4, 1.1.2 (July 1978) (Working Party 111/1),
cited in Markoski, supra note 10, at 309 nn.108-09.
51 25 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L360) 36 (1982) (Decision of the Commission of the European
Communities). The Commission held that the British Telecommunications prohibition on
retransmission was an abuse of a dominant position, in violation of Article 86 of the EEC
Treaty.
52 Commentator Thomas Ramsey suggested that the European Community might take
action against PTTs for anticompetitive practices violative of the Treaty of Rome. Ramsey
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notes that while the European Community's efforts with Euronet have been successful, their
regulation of anticompetitive practices has been less so. Ramsey, supra note 47, at 273-83.
53 Ramsey, supra note 47, at 263-4.
54 A proposal of the EC Commission in 1980 set down four objectives for the European
information service market, the first of which entails transferring Euronet management from
the EC to the individual PTTs, under continuing control and financing from the Commission.
Id. at 258.
5s CCITT Rec. X.75 has proven useful in setting a standard for interconnection. See YELLow
BooK, supra note 9.
56 See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 2; Euronet DIANE News No. 25, Dec. 1981, stating that
"Euronet will become increasingly redundant as the interconnections take place."
57 Several individual nations are also leaning towards a free market telecommunications
system. U.S. deregulatory efforts are slowly being imitated in several nations, and this may
diminish the threat of private leased line abolition. For arguments supporting foreign deregu-
lation see Lamond, supra note 24; Muller, Potential for Competition and the Role of PT"s, 5 TELECOM.
POL'y 18, 22-23 (1981).
Commentator William Fishman feels that the PTT monopoly position "will erode over
time, largely under the pressure of the American example." The New Information Age: Emerging
Legal and Policy Issues 29 (Media Institute, 1982) (statement of William Fishman, former Chief
Counsel, NTIA, Dept. of Commerce). He says the United Kingdom is "moving slowly,
painfully in the direction of opening the market." Id. at 29-30.
The British Parliament has already selectively deregulated the British telecommunications
industry. The new British Telecommunications Act of 1981, Ch. 38, transferred telecommuni-
cations services from the British Post Office umbrella to the exclusive control of British
Telecom (BT). The Act also gives the Secretary of State wide powers to erode the BT
monopoly by licensing parallel competing networks. Whyte, supra note 47, at 240. The first
independent carrier, Mercury Communications, Ltd., has now been licensed, and British
Telecom International (BI) has announced that Mercury is permitted to provide private
leased international circuits to business customers. BTI will remain responsible for all over-
seas telecommunications arrangements, however. 48 TE.LECOM. REP. Dec. 27, 1982, at 39. See
The Future of Telecommunications in Britain, Cmnd. 8610, Dept. Industry, July 1982 (statement in
Parliament (HC) by Sec. of State for Industry, Patrick Jenkin, announcing the government's
policy of liberalization of telecommunications and plans to end BT's monopoly); Telecommuni-
cations Hearings, supra note 8, at 158 (statement of B.C. Burgess).
Sweden recently liberalized its PTTs' rules, and similar deregulatory pressures have been
noted in Japan, Germany, Australia and the Netherlands. Id. Burgess noted that these move-
ments are "spurred by U.S. experience" and that the "progress of U.S. deregulation will be
closely scrutinized abroad."
58 "Private leased circuits may be used only to exchange communications relating to the
business of the customer," and if the circuit is used to route communications "from (to) one
or more users other than the customer, these communications must be concerned exclusively
with the activity for which the circuit was leased." CCITT Rec. D.3, § 1.7 in YELLOw BooK,
supra note 9. Channels leased from a telephone-type circuit must not be sub-leased, id., § 1.8,
and data processing customers "shall not be permitted to operate in the manner of an
Administration by providing telecommunications services to others, id. at § 7.3(d).
59 See supra notes 8, 11, for example of increased tariffs.
60 CCITT Rec. D.1, § 1.10, YEu.ow Boox, supra note 9.
61 Id. at § 1.12. Thus a resale/shared use violation could justifiably trigger such a response.
Recommendation D.1 also provides that Administrations may take "all steps.., to ensure
that the provisions governing the lease of international circuits are respected." Id. at § 1.11.
62 48 Telecom. Rep., Sept. 27, 1982, at 5.
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63 Cable and Wireless Ltd. is Hong Kong's recognized private operating agency.
64 This recommendation was in the form of a "contribution" to a Study Group of the
CCITT. CCIT7 Study Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. III No. 30-E (Dec.
1977) (Cable and Wireless Ltd.) 6, as cited in Markoski, supra note 10, at 303 nn.76-7.
65 Id. at 4.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15 for a discussion of PTT actions manipulating
tariff rates of private lines to protect public networks.
67 See Ramsey, supra note 47, at 241-43.
68 A modem, or "modulator demodulator," converts digital forms into signals suitable for
transmission and receives signals, converting them back into digital form. DAvIES, supra note
40, at 469.
69 Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 8, at 101 (statement of Donald Lehrman, General
Datacom Industries).
70 Lamond, supra note 24, at 214-15.
71 In the current debate over whether rates should reflect carrier costs or the value of the
service to the customer, the FCC has agreed with the users' argument that rates based on costs
result in competition and technological innovation to the benefit of the public. Pool and
Solomon, supra note 18, at 106. Proponents of volume based rates claim these benefits for their
system.
72 Users can complain to the FCC only when an IRC is before the Commission for some
reason, such as when petitioning for approval for new lines or services as required by 47
U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
73 Markoski, supra note 10, at 319. Markoski states that:
One commentator has suggested that users are generally reluctant to lodge complaints
against a PTT "for fear of the impact which any reprisals by a P1T, or group of PTTs,
would have on their business operations and on their revenues. Of course, any director
general of a PTT would be horrified at the suggestion that his or her organization might
retaliate against a complainant-but if one knows the labyrinthine workings of a
typical European PTT, one also knows that there are a multitude of subtle ways in
which a major corporation's international telecommunications operations could be
hindered, harassed or otherwise disrupted without any obvious or overt sign, of
retaliation. TELEPHONY, Jan. 26, 1981, at 73.
Markoski, supra, note 10 at 319 n.157.
74 Markoski, supra note 10, at 299-302. In addition to a fixed monthly rate, usage-sensitive
charges would be imposed based on the number of characters transmitted and the message
duration. Id. at 299 n.53.
75 Id. at 305-11. The IRCs were RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and WUI.
76 Id. at 299-302, 306. These two organizations raised the same objections in opposing the
Japanese "Venus" service. Feldman and Garcia, supra note 30, at 5.
77 Graphnet Systems, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 402, 410 n.9; see Markoski, supra note 10, at 301.
78 ITT World Communications, Inc. Western Union International Line, Inc., RCA Global
Communications, Inc., FCC File Nos. I-T-C-2664-2, I-T-C-2658-2, I-T-C-2657-3 (released
July 12, 1978) (Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Authorization) at 11, 12 n.7 [hereinafter
cited as Hong Kong Order ] as cited in Markoski, id. at 310 n.111; Feldman and Garcia, supra note
30 at 6 n.31. Markoski states that the issue was moot by this time; GE was granted its private
line circuit prior to the FCC's decision, and the CCITT Study Group III Working Party's
Report in 1978 stated that private leased line service must be made available by PTTs and
RPOAs. Markoski, supra note 10, at 309-10. The decision did, however, state the FCC's policy
at the time. See id. at 310-11, noting that the reluctance of the FCC to exert leverage over
foreign correspondents was a departure from earlier decisions.
79 This role is most important when issues have important overlapping trade repercus-
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sions, as is often the case with Japan, the leading challenger to the U.S. for its preeminent
telecommunications position. Markoski suspects that users will be disinclined to utilize the
O.T.R. because of its political role: "negotiations (initiated by the Trade Representative)
might be abandoned in return for trade concessions in non-telecommunications areas."
Markoski, supra note 10, at 319. Users may also be reluctant to complain against PTTs for fear
of reprisals. Id. at n.157.
80 CCITT Study Group III, Comments on a Proposed Study of Leased Circuit Pricing, Doc.
COM III-No. 35-E, para. 5 (Feb. 1978) (U.S.), as quoted in Markoski, supra note 10, at 304;
Hirsch, supra note 18, at 195.
81 In the Matter of Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common
Carrier International Communications Services, 77 F.C.C.2d 831, 838 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Resale Proposed Rulemaking].
82 GTE Telenet Communications Corp., Application for authority to extend its packet-
switched telecommunications services from the continental United States to the United
Kingdom, Europe and points beyond, 91 F.C.C.2d 232 (1982); see 48 TELcom. REP., Aug. 9,
1982, 5-7. The decision approved proposals of GTE-Telenet and Tymnet, Inc. to provide
"enhanced" services free of FCC regulation, and extended the "basic/enhanced" dichotomy
from domestic to international services. This application of the Computer H/decision reflects the
FCC view that deregulation and increased competition will lead to entry into the market by
new firms, services and technologies from which users may choose. Resale Proposed Rule-
making, supra note 81, at 835-36; see also Eger, Global Phenomenon, supra note 18, at 220.
83 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980). This decision was released May 2, 1980. See Frieden, The
International Application of the Second Computer Inquiry, this volume, for a detailed analysis of Computer
If.
84 Eger, Global Phenomenon, supra note 18, at 220; 48 TEiLcoM. REP., Oct. 4, 1982, at 12.
Objections have come from the International Communications Association, a non-profit
trade group of major corporate, government and educational users, as well as from ADAPSO,
WU, and RCA Global. Id.
85 Resale Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 81, at 838-9. In this notice the FCC recognizes that
all international services are governed by operating agreements between IRCs and PTTs, and
states that "we see no reason why preservation of the status quo would be in the best interest
of the foreign correspondents. Indeed, we believe these entities may also derive benefits from
operating in a resale environment." Id. at 836. Reasons cited include increased user demand,
lower per unit costs, and expansion of carrier operations.
ADAPSO warns that while deregulation is possible in the competitive U.S. market, it is
futile to attempt to impose it on foreign PTTs due to their monopoly structure and "well-
known and strongly held views." 48 TEIECOM. REP., Sept. 27, 1982, at 6. The FCC cites
domestic U.S. resale examples which have proven advantageous to the public and the carriers,
i.e., the domestic satellite service and the GTE-Telenet experience. Resale Proposed Rulemak-
ing, supra note 81, at 836-37. Others have agreed with ADAPSO that the U.S. example is not
necessarily a good one to apply to the very different European telecommunications structure.
See Muller, supra note 57, at 21. Moreover, they add that "unilateral efforts by the U.S.
government to implement domestic policies in the international arena are likely to create
problems for users of international telecommunications services, particularly users of private
line service." 48 TELEcoM. REP., Aug. 9, 1982, at 6.
86 48 TELECOM. RaP., Oct. 25,1982, at 16 (statement of Mark Fowler, FCC Chairman). The
IRCs had been subject to FCC restrictions on resale and sharing similar to those imposed by
the PTTs; however, these recent FCC moves toward deregulation of international services
may change this situation. Se Feldman and Garcia, supra note 30, at 5-6 and n.31.
87 Dissenting member Joseph Fogarty warned that "The Commission's good intentions
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